ways: (1) voting within the political party system for the party of change, (2) nonparticipation in politics, and (3) participating in political-oriented violence. Our concern here is with something that fits into none of these categories, namely voting within the established electoral system for a candidate outside of the established party system.
Taking after Durkheim, much of political sociology has conceived of society as an organism which is sometimes diseased.
The general hypothesis is that large-scale social changes-lead to strains in society which find expression in political protest. This is how Parsons explained the rise of the fascist movement in Germany (Parsons, 1942) , the McCarthy movement of the fifties (1964a), and the radical right in the early sixties (1964b) . He failed to specify the mechanisms by which this occurs, and his approach is somewhat mysterious for that reason. Fortunately, some of his followers are more.
specific (see Smelser, 1963) .
Theorists have focused on many different societal changes as sources of social strain, including change per -se (Hoffer, 1951) ; differentiation (Eisenstadt, 1966:31) ; increased communication and alienation from the means of production (Marx, 1959, especially p. 18) ; rationalization (Parsons, 1942) ; affluence (Schurnpeter, 1962; Inglehart, 1971; Segal and Felson, 1970) ; technological change (Ogburn, 1922.) ; and urbanization--particularly size, density and heterogeneity of the population . (Wirth, 1938) . Social historians have supplied a list of catchy terms for these changes--the industrial revolution, (Hoffer, 1951; Johnson, 1966) . Others have treated the social stratification system as the locus of social strain: social change either deprives men of.some crucial social reward, or catalyzes cleavages for which the potential has always existed. Segal and Felson (1970) . suggest . that affluence enhances conflict because it places greater resources in the hands of conflict groups. Following Tocqueville (1955), Gurr (1968) concludes that social change engenders rising expectations, relative deprivation, hence revolution. Eisenstadt (1966:22, 122) reasons that the increasing interdependence of groups arising from differentiation intensifies their impingement on each other, thereby contributing to political protest. In a similar vein, Bell (1964) attributes the growth of the American radical right in the early sixties to the displacement of old elitesby new ones, while Tilly (1969) explains collective violence as ,the result of competition among groups gaining, maintaining, or losing their position in the polity. Marx (1959) attributes the demise of capitalism partly to the restructuring of social contacts and communication in capitalist society, which leads the proletariat to discover its objective interest and to organize. On the other hand, Trotsky (1959:9) suggests that deracinated peasants who become urban workers are more likely to break with the past than the established proletariat. Hauser asserts that the . .
social-morphological revolution leads to "the chaotic society" by enhancing ecalogical competition (from Park, 1936) , , and by intensifying moral-density (from Durkheim, 1964) .
Another way in which social change may lead to political disruption is by increasing status inconsistency of individuals.
Assuming that individuals high on one status and low on another status undergo personal strains, they may be more likely to participate in political protest of the left. (Lenski, 1954) or of the right (Rush, 1967; Hunt and Cushing, 1971) . The concept of status inconsistency .has been applied not only to individuals, but also to occupational groups (Hodge, 1962) ; hations in their international relations (Tanter, 1969) ; and ' societies in their aggregate reward systems (Galtung, ,1964; Woelfel, '1970; Sorokin, 1947) . Galtung theorizes that. societies in which education grows faster than the job . . market for educated people will be plagued by revolution.
One can answer the general hypothesis that some changes lead to political protest with the counter-hypothesis that other changes reduce strain, hence mit'iga'te revolutionary tendencies. Bell (1960) and Lane (1965) , 1967; Dahrendorf, 1959; Simmel, 1964; Landecker, 1970) .
Wiley

OBJECT OF THIS STUDY
This study cannot directly test any of the broad theories mentioned--if indeed any study could do that. Rather, we wili derive from several of these theories some rather concrete hypotheses about one specific type of political protest:
. , . . ' the support for George Wallace in the 1968 electio'n. We will not directly measure any of the assertions about the.recruitment of specific individuals to protest movements, or about the behavior of total societies in the course of history. Our purpose is much more modest: to study the level of support for one movement at one point in time across several American " communities which are presumed to be at different stages of social development. Our inferences from the data must be more limited than the theories reviewed. tests accordingly.
Measurement and sampling error aside, a difference of a few percentage points in Wallace vote was important for its psychological impact, which depended on winning a noticeable minority rather than a majority.
. .
DATA ANALYSIS
The most basic hypothesis abstracted from the literature is that societal change leads to political protest. We were the most recent data available.
As Population change, in-migration, education, income and per cent white collar all tend to cluster together, as expected (see Table 1 ). Similarly, self-employment is negatively related to all of these, save in-migration.
Contrary to Parsons' perspective, no relationship was found between bureaucratization (per cent white collar) and support for Wallace, at the zero-order level. As one would , predict from a semi-Marxist perspective, there is more support for Wallace in districts which have greater alienation from the means of production, that is less self-employment (r=.116).
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As predicted from Schumpeter, Inglehart, as well as Segal and
Felson, but contrary to the perspective of Lane and Bell, there is a positive relationship between the 1968 vote for Wallace and the median income of the district (r=.130).
I> ~he'next step is to investigate the functions and dysfunctions of inequality. We measured income inequality by computing the standard deviation by income for each district.
However, a standard deviation of $500 is socially more significant in districts which have a mean income of $4,000 than in districts with a mean income of $8,000. Therefore, our index of income inequality was standardized by dividing the standard .
deviation by the mean, to give us the coefficient of variability for each district.6 The same procedure was followed using years of education to give us a measure of educational inequal- Two distinct types of inconsistency were coded--that in which income was in a higher quartile than education and that in which education was in a higher quartile than income. The same procedure was followed in coding inconsistencies between level of education and level of white-collar employment. Analysis of variance was performed to uncover differences between consistent and inconsistent districts. Panel A in Table 2 1 h shows a small, statistically significant relationship between (Table 3) . The changes which take place in modern society cut both ways in their effects on political protest, at least with respect to the support for George Wallace.
The high intercorrelations among these independent variables and the lack of a clear causal order among them 'makes it difficult to build a path model with more than a few of them. Figure 1 shows a theoretically reasonable model, assuming that population change measures community growth as well as demographic change. The model is supported by the fact that the.correlations which it predicts approximate those observed,l and by the fact that thescomputed correlation between the residuals (taking education and the-Wallace vote as dependent variables) was .052, close to zero. Figure 1 illustrates the following . multivariate theory of social change and political protest: icommunity growth generates a boom in education, which reduces the relative inequality of education in districts. This reduction in inequality leads to a lower level of political protest. On the other hand, community growth itself increases political protest (in Hauser's terms, the "social morphological revolution" leads to "the chaotic society"). Migration to districts has three effects: it escalates population growth, hence protest; it contributes to educational inequality, probably by depositing a new crop of poorly-educated and very well-educated people in the same district; and it contributes to the education boom by increasing community growth, hence mitigating inequality and dissent.
The model shown in Figure 1 implies that different aspects of social change affect society differently, canceling each other out to some extent. While the overall correlation between population change and Wallace vote is positive, its magnitude is not great. One might say that, while some .forces heat up the.po1iti.c~ of a changing society, other forces cool it down. On the whole there was somewhat more heating up in 1968 than usual, insofar as third-party movements are concerned, To indirectly measure this, we separated out those ten districts with over 7% Negroes and over 18% population growth.
These districts had a mean of 11.09% Wallace votes, 3.03% more than the other districts. blacks and whites, thereby intensifying political protest. 
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Correlations are above the diagonal. Number of cases for each pairwise correlations is found below the diagonal. *p(.0005 one-tailed that the correlation is significantly greater than zero (or less than zero)., according to hypotheses derived from the literature.
#p (-05 one tailed. .127, certainly in the same order of magnitude.
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